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Beyond orientalism: exploring the distinctive feminism 
of democratic confederalism in Rojava 
  
Abstract 
Women have been central to the revolution in Rojava, leading to widespread interest 
in the Kurdish women’s movement across Western contexts. Yet Western mass 
media representations of women combatants tend to be objectifying and superficial, 
glossing over the unique variety of feminism, known as “jineology,” that is core to 
the political system of Rojava, which operates according to the ideology of 
“democratic confederalism.” This paper is intended as a corrective to the inadequate 
representation of the theory and praxis of the women’s movement in Rojava. It 
approaches this task by: (a) critiquing the popular representation of women in Rojava, 
and (b) providing an overview of the features of the distinctive feminism that are in 
operation, with a focus on intersectionality, autonomous spaces, and combatting 
masculinity.  
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Introduction 
The withdrawal of Syrian state institutions within Western Kurdistan in 2011 allowed 
the Democratic Union Party—the Partiya Yekîtiaya Demokrat (PYD)—to assume 
control of the region through the efforts of militants within the People’s Protection 
Units— “Yekîneyên Parastina Gel” (YPG), and the Women’s Protection Units— 
“Yekîneyên Parastina Jin” (YPJ). Since then, the autonomous region has been 
governed according to the ideology of “democratic confederalism,” whose theoretical 
foundations were described by Abdullah Öcalan, the long-imprisoned leader of the 
Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê) (PKK) in Turkey. 
Democratic confederalism calls for an autonomous yet anti-statist form of 
governance, based on participatory, rather than representational, democracy,  and 
with feminism and environmentalism as key guiding values.  
Democratic confederalism in Rojava denounces nationalism, instead consisting of 
the collaboration and interdependence of multiple poly-ethnic, self-organised groups, 
whose democracy is fulfilled by citizens' direct engagement in “people's assemblies.” 
Within Rojava, the base unit of political organisation is the “commune,” which 
consists of an entire small village, or several streets within a city. At the second level, 
“neighbourhood people’s councils” gather together a collection of communes within 
the same geographical vicinity. At the third level, “district people’s councils” 
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encompass entire cities or collections of rural neighbourhoods. Finally, at the fourth 
level, the “People’s Council of West Kurdistan” is made up of representatives of each 
district people’s council (Knapp et al. 2016). One People’s Council represents each 
of the four cantons of Rojava: Afrin, Jazira, Kobane, and Shaba, with regular 
interchange across cantons. Quotas are enforced at all levels to ensure the 
representation of women in all decision-making, with 40% of governance positions 
at all levels to be held by democratically-elected women, 40% by democratically-
elected men, and the remaining 20% for anyone receiving the largest share of the 
remaining votes. As such, the political representation of women is maintained 
between 40% and 60%.  
Much is made of the fact that within Rojava, women are represented at all levels of 
political governance; still more is made of their role as front-line combatants within 
dedicated military units. Whilst these are notable advances towards gender justice by 
any standards, the most distinctive feature of Rojava is the underlying values that 
drive these realities: a unique political ideology that not only accommodates feminist 
values, but defiantly centres them. It is important to note that while Öcalan’s 
influential writings have undoubtedly been pivotal in prioritising women’s rights, 
women have for many decades played a prominent leadership role in the PKK, and 
have struggled for their place within the movement.1 As Al-Ali and Tas point out, 
feminist considerations have “clearly come about through the long-term political 
struggle of the Kurdish women’s movement that has challenged the male political 
leadership consistently over the past decades” (2017, 6).  
The objective of this article is to undertake a tentative analysis of the feminism that 
is practiced in Rojava, drawing on journalism and the nascent academic literature. 
Given the region’s relatively recent establishment, the pace at which on-the-ground 
realities shift, and the context of war, this study consists of a philosophical analysis 
which draws on the academic literature and journalism relating to Rojava, rather than 
fieldwork. While it is widely assumed that the political transformation is in some 
sense feminist, there is a paucity of analysis as to the particular features of the 
feminism that is enacted in Rojava. Instead, there is a glut of mass media coverage 
which focusses on women’s military action and avoids engagement with the 
underlying ideology. My paper therefore has two aims: to show that women’s role in 
Rojava is often simplified or misrepresented in Western media representations, and 
to address these lacunae by describing the feminism enacted in Rojava, particularly 
in its contrast to dominant forms of Western feminism.  
This paper will proceed as follows. In the next section, I describe the way in which 
Western media have typically represented women in Rojava, and argue that the 
politics of the movement have been overlooked, leaving the most unique and edifying 
features of the revolution under-explored. I take up this corrective in the subsequent 
section, and analyse the way in which elements of feminist theory play out in Rojava, 
focussing on intersectionality, autonomous spaces, and combatting masculinity.  
Whilst at times, I will speak of Kurdish women as a whole, and will use examples 
from the four states (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey) across which Kurdistan is divided in 
order to make aspects of transnational Kurdish culture and experience vivid, this 
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article relates only to West Kurdistan (Rojava). I make almost no reference to 
Kurdistan of Iran (Rojhilat), where resistance is suppressed to the point of invisibility, 
and little reference to the socially traditional and economically neoliberal Kurdish 
Region in Iraq (Bashur), whose ideology differs radically from Rojava. There are 
close and important ideological parallels between Rojava and Kurdistan of Turkey 
(Bakur),3 but the extent of state repression in the latter renders the contemporary 
practical realities quite distinct.  
Western Kurdistan in the Western imagination 
Rehearsing Western perspectives on Rojava might seem an unusual and problematic 
point of departure, but the purpose of this paper is to reconcile representations and 
realities of feminism in Rojava, and given the hegemony of Western media,4 it is 
likely that prevailing representations originate there. In this section I describe the 
nature and motivations for the depoliticised representation of the women’s movement 
in Rojava, in order to prepare the ground for the re-politicising which is undertaken 
in the remainder of the paper.   
Media attention grants increased visibility to Kurdish women in the public domain, 
producing the opportunity for solidarity from external parties, and for greater 
awareness of injustices committed against Kurds in general. Unsurprisingly, Western 
coverage of the women of Rojava follows Orientalising narratives.5 In the Western 
public imaginary, West Asian6 men are readily characterised as violent, while West 
Asian women are stereotyped as meek, submissive, and downtrodden (Khalid 2011; 
Abu-Loghod 2001; Yegenoglu 1998). These representations have facilitated different 
pragmatic ends at different historical moments, most notably colonialism and 
military intervention (Nayak 2006; Tickner 2001). In Rojava, these stereotypes infect 
coverage of women’s role in combat, with some notable variations on a theme. For 
example, the tone of astonishment in newspaper articles when reporting on women 
soldiers in Rojava derives not merely from the difficulty in accepting the idea of 
women as soldiers, or soldiers as women, it also reflects astonishment at West Asian 
women acting autonomously i.e. brown women saving themselves from brown men, 
thereby flouting Spivak’s (1994) famous dictum, and disrupting the stereotype.  
Despite making up more than a third of combatants within Rojava, women militias 
are generally surprising regardless of the context, and there needn’t be anything 
condescending in pointing that out. What is problematic is the way in which the 
interest in women soldiers belligerently centres their identities as women, in the most 
superficial and essentialist sense of the category, rather than addressing the more 
important questions relating to the details of their military incursions or the 
motivations for their action: elements which would acknowledge the agency 
underwriting the decision to risk one’s life. This is a familiar trope for women 
operating outside of gender stereotypes: that they are women doing x is frequently 
elevated above the details of x.7 By analogy, consider that women politicians, writers, 
and sportspeople are frequently interviewed about stereotypical aspects of being 
women, rather than the work for which they are famed, or are described in the media 
in ways that focus primarily on their appearance, regardless of its relevance to that 
work. 
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Given the above, it was perhaps unsurprising that in 2014, Kurdish women’s 
visibility in the public sphere had been commodified into something suitably 
feminine: multinational fashion retailer H&M marketed a jumpsuit which mimicked 
the YPJ uniform (Ismail 2014). Further, objectification seems to be too great a 
temptation for many journalists, who brazenly comment on the physical appearance 
of women fighters (Gol 2016), bringing their representation under the Orientalizing 
“male gaze” (Mulvey 1989) by portraying them as exotic novelties for the visual 
consumption of a Western audience,8 who are supposed to consume the article as a 
curious example of the exotic behaving exotically. Reports are invariably 
accompanied by images of women in military regalia, as though to pre-empt the 
reader’s incredulity.  
Examples of the objectification of Kurdish women soldiers in mass media abound, 
and I describe just a few examples here. The women of Rojava are referred to as 
“Öcalan’s angels” in the subtitle of one article (Tavakolian 2016), referring to the US 
television show, Charlie’s angels, in which a man—Charlie—remotely directs the 
crime-fighting efforts of his attractive women employees: an obviously trivialising 
comparison. Elsewhere, a Kurdish soldier is described as a “petite women wearing a 
black pantsuit, white sweater and no makeup” and another as an “attractive 21-year-
old dressed in fatigues” (Rubin 2016). In a UK newspaper, an entire report focusses 
on Kurdish women soldiers wearing lipstick on the frontline (Webb 2016), while a 
piece within another UK newspaper with the second-largest circulation claims that 
Kurdish soldiers “refuse to go without makeup while gunning down ISIS fighers” 
(Brown 2016). One article opens with the baffling detail that “Beritan, 30, likes to 
wear her hair in a bun with blue pins to hold her tight black curls. Lilav, 19, prefers 
an elaborate braid that starts from the top of her head. The much older Berfin opts for 
a softer, lower one” (Argentieri 2015). The author goes on to claim that “To further 
demonstrate their femininity, many YPJ soldiers tie colorful scarves around their 
necks or waists. Each of them has their own style of dressing. Beyond paying 
attention to their looks, they take their fight very seriously” (Argentieri 2015).9 
Consider the wording of that final sentence, which positions Kurdish women’s 
interest in their appearance as prior to their interest in their struggle. While this kind 
of objectification is common in the media, as described above, it is particularly 
illuminative in relation to women fighters. It seems to respond to an unspoken 
challenge: surely these women soldiers are not “real” women? The authors seem 
eager to reassure us that while a major gender stereotype has been breached, in every 
other sense these women are reassuringly gender-stereotypical. Specifically, they are 
characterised as trivial and superficial in ways that are consistent with more general 
portrayals of women in the public eye.  
Objectification is in itself morally troubling, but in the case of women of the YPJ, 
this objectification leads to further moral issues by threatening to portray women 
fighters as fungible and one-dimensional; as indistinguishable from one another and 
defined only through the spectacle of being women soldiers. This detracts from the 
real vulnerabilities of being combatants in a brutal, long-term conflict; fighting also 
means being kidnapped, assaulted, injured, and killed. In the same way that Black 
women have long been portrayed through the harmful “Strong Black Woman” 
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stereotype, which constructs invulnerability and facilitates dehumanisation 
(Beauboeuf-Lafontant 2009), so too might these media representations cast Kurdish 
women as “superwomen,” whose bravery is one facet of their mystifying Otherness 
or lack of sensibility, and to whom support and protection need not be extended. 
Further, combat is not the only threat to the safety and wellbeing of the women of 
Rojava—they fight against the backdrop of a society with robust and limiting peace-
time patriarchal norms. Prior to the establishment of the new governance structures 
in Rojava, polygamy, forced marriage, child marriage, honour killings, domestic 
violence, and gender-based discrimination were common, and were resistant to 
legislation as these matters were generally managed through religious courts (Gupta, 
2016a). I return to this topic in the next section. 
The readiness with which Kurdish women have been portrayed as sexualised poster-
girls of a global anti-Daesh sentiment seems to have been facilitated by various 
properties which serve to reduce the threat perceived by Western powers. These are: 
gender, secularity, phenotype, statelessness, and poverty. As women, combatants of 
the YPJ are regarded to be non-threatening—their violence (despite its proven 
fatality) is not represented as intimidating or inevitable. Against the fetishising 
backdrop described above, Kurdish women’s violent military tactics are even given 
a baffling free pass—they move under the radar of moral acceptability without 
comment. Given Western perspectives on non-state violence in other contexts, it is 
surprising indeed that Western media has steered clear of presenting YPJ soldiers as 
terrorists, or lamenting their lethal tactics, which have included suicide attacks10 and 
the inclusion of under-age soldiers.11 Second, the YPJ is a secular organisation. To 
the extent that Islam is viewed as a grave threat to Western security, secularity moves 
Kurdish violence away from classic “terrorism” as seen through a Western lens.12 
Third, Kurdish people are often pale-skinned and light-eyed in relation to typical 
regional phenotypes, a fact which journalists have been keen to note. Consider that 
the most famed Kurdish soldier, machine-gunner Asia Ramazan Antar, who was 
killed by Daesh in 2016, was repeatedly and effusively compared to white American 
actor Angelina Jolie (Gol 2016), while an image of a blonde fighter named Rehana, 
dubbed the “Angel of Kobane” was also widely shared across mainstream media 
(Rakusen et al. 2014). As such, there may be a tendency, rooted in racist assumptions, 
to regard Kurds as bearing significant similarities to Europeans, mitigating their 
status as Other.13 Next, Kurds have throughout their history lacked a state of their 
own, and cannot pose the threat which may stem from the powers associated with 
statehood. Finally, Kurdish populations are burdened with poverty, which, combined 
with restrictions on basic rights across the four states, limits their political power 
(Saaid 2016; Khoshnaw 2013; Tejel 2008; Gorvett 2008). Kurds have therefore been 
perceived in the West as a vulnerable, disempowered, wretched group whose threat 
to Western cultures and security is negligible.                    
These threat-reducing factors have permitted the mass media to report on the 
women’s struggle within Rojava in ways that are largely affirmative of their 
endeavour (Leezenberg 2016, pp. 681-682), bucking the trend of vilifying West 
Asian peoples and armed liberation movements more generally. Indeed, this may be 
engineered, at least in part, by Kurds themselves. Begikhani et al. (2018) reflect that 
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women of the YPJ may deliberately “mobilise the imaginary of heroic women for 
internal and external propaganda.” It certainly seems to be the easiest way for Rojava 
to attract the attention of the world at large. One unspoken condition of this 
representation has been that the mass media has generally avoided explicating the 
political ideology which underwrites women’s participation in the emerging political 
and military apparatus of Rojava. Since democratic confederalism has close 
genealogical and ideological associations with Marxism, exposition of the political 
details would not be likely to popularise the Kurdish cause in European or North 
American contexts, a matter which is complicated by the fact that the US has 
provided funding to the YPG and YPJ (Hasan 2018). 
Yet there is also a gendered dimension. Women are seldom viewed as full political 
actors, therefore their cause is more easily depoliticised: reduced to merely repelling 
Daesh, fleeing the clutches of barbaric Kurdish men, or devotedly assisting those 
same men in war.14 More often than not, no rationale is posited, or any political 
nuance loses out to discourses about resisting the horrors of Islamism, and assumes 
the tone of a “civilizational narrative […] that divides the world into good (Kurds) 
versus evil (Islamists)” (Küçük and Özselçuk 2016, p. 185). Frustratingly, the 
portrayal of women in Rojava rarely pays tribute to the decades-long history of 
women combatants and political leaders within various Kurdish liberation fronts.15 
In this issue, Şimşek and Jongerden (2018, 2-3) describe the conditionality of 
Western reverence for Kurdish women militants. Specifically, positive coverage is 
conditional on the (false) representation of Kurdish women as being similar to 
Westerners in significant ways, and fighting for a way of life that is closely allied 
with Western liberalism. The known commonality—opposition to Daesh—is 
extrapolated to more significant ideological overlap, which is both inaccurate and 
instrumentalising.  
Of particular concern in this context is the way in which depoliticisation disguises 
the feminist credentials of the movement, and misses an opportunity to witness an 
attempt at a different set of social relations. Further, if feminism is considered, the 
assumption that Kurdish women reflect Western values might also lead to the 
erroneous conclusion that Rojavan feminism reflects dominant forms in the West, i.e. 
neoliberal feminism. In what follows, I hope to atone for these lacunae in Western 
media discourses on the women’s movement in Rojava by drawing out some of its 
most notable instantiations of feminist theory and praxis. 
Feminism in Rojava 
Behind the scenes of the much-discussed women on the frontline, and underwriting 
their actions, a bespoke feminist epistemology is in operation in Rojava, known as 
“jineology”: the science, or study, of women (jin). Jineology has been under 
development since 2011 (Kaya 2014), intending to “fill the gaps that the current 
social sciences are incapable of doing” (Nurhak 2017) and to resocialise women, 
providing a set of formalised structures for feminist consciousness-raising. Key to 
jineology is the idea that gender is never just gender, but is rather embedded within 
a nexus of other oppressive social relations.  
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Al-Ali and Tas (2018b) have criticised jineology for its assumption of exceptionalism 
and its failure to engage with the work of other feminist theorists and activists. They 
suggest that jineology instead seems to “ethnicise the political experiences and 
struggles of Kurdish women” (2018b, 467), treating their challenges and responses 
as singular. In their work in Iraq, they found that Kurdish women activists tended to 
“equate feminism with white western liberal feminism, as opposed to its Marxist, 
postcolonial or transnational feminist strands” (2018b, 467). While this may seem 
like a frustrating simplification or distortion, the gloss is justifiable either by 
ignorance or design: indeed, not all feminism is neoliberal feminism, but the forms 
that are most prominent within Western contexts undoubtedly are, and it is these that 
are most likely to determine the operative definition and to be exported widely. 
Further, it is certainly understandable in the case of Kurdish women, who qua their 
Kurdish identities, have been subject to ethnicising oppression, to centre ethnic 
considerations in developing their feminism. 
It is precisely this uniqueness that this section aims to draw out. The effect of media 
representations of women in Rojava is to define the women’s struggle as a war 
against Daesh, a simplification that meshes with a rudimentary description of Daesh 
as anti-feminist. Yet the women of Rojava do not merely seek to deter the patriarchal 
extremists they encounter on the frontlines. Their struggle is a positive one, which 
seeks to radically restructure their peacetime society, and to lay the foundations for 
communities that are robustly free from oppression and inequality.  
The form of feminism which has become part of the establishment within Rojava—
as described by jineology—is substantively different to the “neoliberal” feminism 
that has most successfully infiltrated political, economic, and cultural institutions 
within Western contexts (Rottenberg 2014; Budgeon 2015; Prügl 2015). Neoliberal 
feminism focusses on the effects of gender inequality on individuals, and introduces 
measures designed to increase the chance of an individual woman accessing to the 
social power held by some men. By contrast, jineology “regards itself as both a 
continuation of the feminist struggle and as an alternative to a branch of feminism 
which has not broken with capitalism” (Kongreya Star 2016). 
Pace Al-Ali and Tas’s work in Iraq (2018b), the Kurdish women’s movement in 
Rojava is rich in its interaction with broader feminist traditions and its 
implementation of those traditions as praxis. The chief explanation for this 
convergence is straightforward: Kurdish feminists are closely engaging with extant 
feminist work (Leezenberg 2016, p.682) and implementing it as they develop 
jineology, which relates specifically to the experience of Kurdish women. As Graeber 
has noted: 
It never occurs to [those in the West] that people in Kurdistan might be 
reading Judith Butler too. […] It just doesn’t seem to occur to them they 
might be taking these things way further than “Western standards” ever have; 
that they might genuinely believe in the principles that Western states only 
profess (Graeber and Öğünç 2014). 
Al-Ali and Tas themselves acknowledge that Öcalan cites a range of influences, 
including “Emma Goldman, Immanuel Wallerstein, V. Gordon Childe, Fernand 
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Braudel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, the Frankfurt School and the 
Zapatistas” (Al-Ali and Tas 2018a 13), so that those building on his work are 
inevitably, if indirectly, absorbing the teachings of other thinkers. This serves as an 
explanation for the convergence of aspects of democratic confederalism with other 
feminisms elsewhere, which have their own roots in these texts and others. Further, 
democratic confederalism shares its conceptual genealogy with many elements of 
feminist theory which are descended from, or related to, Marxism. There is perhaps 
also an element of inevitable organic convergence on feminist themes when one 
attempts to enact a heterogeneous participatory democracy seeking egalitarianism 
along multiple identities.  
The ideology of Rojava centres intersectionality, places value on autonomous spaces, 
and confronts the challenges posed by masculinity. As such, it is markedly different 
to the forms of feminism which prevail in mainstream political, economic, and 
cultural institutions in the West, which are generally focussed on atomistic individual 
identities. Each of the subsequent three subsections briefly rehearses the way in 
which praxis in Rojava fulfils or interacts with these elements of feminist theory. 
This analysis is not intended to be exhaustive, not least because feminist praxis within 
Rojava is under constant development, and there are currently epistemic challenges 
due to the geopolitical context. Rather, it aims to be indicative of the important 
nuances that have been glossed in popular representations.  
Intersectionality 
“Intersectionality” was coined by critical race theory scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw 
(1991) to formalise the intersecting effects of racism and sexism experienced by 
women of colour, which can be obscured by a myopic focus on sexism or racism as 
independent axes of oppression. Conceptually, the notion had long been in use 
amongst women of colour.16 Crenshaw noted that intersectionality, understood as the 
recognition of overlapping marginal identities, also demands that one apprehend the 
non-predictability of those permutations. One cannot infer the intersection of two 
identities from their singular incarnations, no matter how sophisticated the 
calculations; rather, these intersections tend to be generative of unique experiences 
of their own. When exploring the experiences of those situated at the intersections, 
one must therefore rely on first-hand experiences rather than suppositions about the 
outcomes of particular combinations.  
Intersectionality is an urgent consideration in Rojava, where manifold marginal 
identities superimpose in ways that mirror the complex, fragmented history of the 
region. Kurdish feminists have acknowledged parallels between their struggle and 
that of Black women in the US, typified by their exclusion, and the exclusion of their 
concerns, from mainstream feminist movements (Al-Rebholz 2013; Özcan 2011). 
Both are marginalised groups within states which enact forms of repression best 
described as “internal colonialism” (c.f. Wolpe 1975). As such, given the substantial 
contribution that Black feminists have made to feminist theory in the Western canon, 
one should not be surprised to find that aspects of this theory are apposite in the 
Kurdish case.  
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There are various ways in which intersectionality plays out in Rojava, where women 
in particular are suspended in a complex web of oppressions. Democratic 
confederalism is premised on the value and expertise of each positionality. The 
ideology has been described as an attempt at “Mesopotamian multiculturalism” 
(Leezenberg 2016, p.674) —an apt descriptor for Rojava, which strives towards 
multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-religious governance. Direct democracy is 
enacted via citizen’s assemblies, and this enables the expression of individual 
positionalities in political governance. Quotas, which necessarily enshrine the value 
of diverse positionalities, distribute leadership roles along lines of gender and 
ethnicity in recognition of the differential interests of these identity groups. Posts are 
rotated regularly to avoid the concentration of power and the neglect of particular 
considerations.  
I will briefly consider four motifs: ethnicity, gender, nationality, and class. These 
intersecting axes of oppression delimit the social landscape of Rojava, and have 
accordingly been earmarked for specific interventions as democratic confederalism, 
in its non-centralised decision-making, creates space for the recognition of multiple 
identities. I also consider sexuality, as a way of demonstrating a serious failure of 
intersectionality in Rojava. 
i. Ethnicity 
Kurds have long been the victims of ethnocentrism in each of the nations across 
which Kurdistan is divided. Saraçoglu (2010) describes stereotypes of Kurds in 
Izmir, Turkey, as "ignorant and cultureless," "benefit scroungers," and “invaders.” 
Sezgin and Wall (2005) explore the role of the Turkish media in perpetuating racist 
stereotypes of this kind, and conclude that Kurds in the media are “mostly associated 
with terrorism [...] and are portrayed as divisive and as putting forth unreasonable 
demands. […] The framework of the coverage is very nationalistic and regards Kurds 
as enemy others, belittling and discrediting their existence and cultural values” (p. 
795). Other forms of ethnocentrism across the four regions include the suppression 
of Kurdish languages and culture, discrimination in employment, and considerable 
state violence, including genocide (Mojab 2003) and the destruction of entire Kurdish 
settlements (Ergil 2000). At various points in the decades prior to the establishment 
of democratic confederalism in Rojava, many Kurds had their citizenship revoked, 
the Kurdish language was widely suppressed, references to Kurds were removed 
from educational materials, and the registration of Kurdish names was refused by 
state authorities (Tejel 2008).  
Around a million (Ammann 2005, p. 1012) Kurds make up the European diaspora, 
where racism is arguably just as endemic, if less specific. Kurds have lately 
experienced the sharp end of the rise of racist populism within Europe, aimed largely 
at those of West Asian appearance. One of the most high-profile cases of racial 
violence in post-Brexit Britain involved the near-fatal beating of seventeen-year-old 
Reker Ahmed (Pai 2017), a Kurdish asylum-seeker from Iran, at the hands of a group 
of thirty British youths. Kurdish infant Alan Kurdi’s inanimate face in the sand of a 
Bodrum beach, which caused a momentary outpouring of European compassion 
towards child refugees, was also telling. First, it suggested that whiteness is a 
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condition for European sympathy—two children have drowned in the Mediterranean 
every day since Alan’s death in 2015 (UNHCR; UNICEF; IOM 2016), yet the image 
of his pale lifeless body was so redolent of a European child that it has been unique 
in the response it has generated (El-Enany 2016). Second, it served as a reminder that 
Kurds are major casualties of the refugee crisis. Just as Kurdish identity has been 
forged by the borders drawn between the Zagros and the Taurus, so too do borders 
elsewhere dictate the fate of Kurdish bodies. Border imperialism across Europe 
proscribes sanctuary for Kurds fleeing conflict or persecution.  
Kurds, then, face racism in their ancestral lands and in the diaspora. In Rojava, where 
they are the majority ethnic group, ethnicity is a prominent concern. Despite Kurdish 
ethnicity having underwritten aspects of the traditional nationalism of the Kurdish 
struggle, contending with ethnocentrism for so long has imparted a vital lesson. The 
Constitution of Rojava makes an explicit commitment to ensuring the equality of 
Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Arameans, Turkmen, Armenians and Chechens, 
with quotas to ensure representation of each ethnic and religious group (Cemgil 2016, 
p.425), a secular Constitution which enshrines freedom of religion, and a 
commitment to multi-lingual institutions.  
It is interesting to note that while racist state persecution across the four regions has 
tended to ethnicise Kurds’ political identities, in Rojava it seems that the freedom 
from state violence may have begun to liberate Kurds from that identity, and made 
space for the commitment to ensure that other groups are not similarly marginalised.  
ii. Gender 
Kurdish culture remains highly patriarchal, with honour killings still a widespread 
practice (e.g. Hague et al. 2013). In the three decades up to 2005, as many as 181 
women were killed by their relatives in Urfa, a Turkish city with a substantial Kurdish 
population (Belge 2008). Honour killings benefit from an exemption from or 
reduction of penalty in the Syrian penal code (Danish Refugee Council 2007). Forced 
marriage, polygamy (Al-Ali and Pratt 2011a), and domestic violence are also 
common, and in some areas, female genital mutilation is practiced (Geraci and 
Mulders 2016; Yasin et al. 2013).  
When interviewed by Al-Ali and Tas (2017, 7) shortly before her assassination in 
Paris, PKK co-founder Sakine Cansız described the dual oppression of ethnicity and 
patriarchy: 
That is why I went to the mountains to fight against the state. At the same 
time as I am fighting for Kurdish rights, our fight is against the patriarchal 
structure of the state. […] [P]eace should include the rights of different ethnic 
groups like Kurds, and also the rights of women. Until both of these are 
achieved, it is not possible to claim that we have peace. And without these, I 
will continue to fight, whether the state is Turkish or Kurdish. 
Whilst the motivation for men fighting within the PKK relates almost exclusively to 
the desire to seek justice for Kurds in the face of genocide, incarceration, and cultural 
cleansing, women’s reasons also include the desire to escape the banalities and 
dangers of patriarchal society (Pope 2013, 130; Tejel 2008, note 34).  
11 
 
In addition to Kurdish patriarchal culture, Kurdish women also contend with state 
patriarchies, including Islamic rule in Iran, conservative Islamism in Turkey,17 and 
feudal patriarchy in Iraq, not to mention the threat posed by the radical patriarchies 
of Islamist groups within the region.  Further, as described in the previous section, 
Kurdish women are also subject to Western patriarchy, one major effect of which is 
to obfuscate a productive understanding of their struggle, limiting opportunities for 
solidarity and community-building.  
Challenging patriarchy in the political and personal realms is a priority in Rojava, 
where democratic confederalism identifies patriarchy as the most fundamental form 
of subjugation, and its abolition a sine qua non in obtaining true democracy (Öcalan, 
2013a, p.11). In accordance with this aim, the social contract of Rojava forbids child 
marriage, forced marriage, polygamy, honour killings, and dowry payments, 
legislates in favour of women’s right to political participation, legalises abortion, and 
establishes gender equality in the law (Barkhoda 2016; Loo 2016). Women are 
proportionally represented at all political levels as well as having their own 
autonomous governance structures and military troops.  
A particularly notable legislative change is the equality of women and men in the 
judicial system. In many interpretations of Islam, a women’s testimony is equivalent 
to only half of a man’s. This is a flagrant example of institutionalised testimonial 
injustice, and within parts of Syria, Iraq, and Iran, (Unicef, 2011a; 2011b; 2011c) it 
is still common for this sexist testimonial weighting to be enacted in courts. In 
Rojava, the Constitution demands that men and women’s testimonies be treated 
equally (Radpey 2015, p.839).  In the canton of Jazira more resolute advances have 
been made, with the establishment of “women’s houses” (malê jin) under whose 
auspices gender-specific issues (e.g. sexual harassment, domestic violence, rape, 
child marriage, and polygamy) are tackled by women (Küçük and Özselçuk 2016, p. 
190), who are deemed to hold epistemic privilege on these issues owing to their 
greater stake in them.     
ii. Nationality 
The idea of nationhood has long preoccupied Kurdish identity, an inevitability for a 
people who find themselves “in the very position of a border that the nation-states of 
the region violently mark in order to unify their identities” (Küçük and Özselçuk 
2016, p.187). Until recently, nationhood was the foremost objective of activists and 
politicians across the four regions. Even in Rojava, where the move towards 
democratic confederalism entails the rejection of the conventional nation state, the 
struggle for a homeland as haven of safety, belonging and autonomy, remains a 
recurring theme in a collective conception of the raison d'être of Rojava.    
Across their lands, Kurds’ relationship to their official nationality has been a troubled 
one, not unlike that of Palestinians (Kumaraswamy 2006, pp.70-71). State violence 
over many decades and across many borders has rendered Kurdish people colonised 
in their own land. This violence, both structural and actual, has been largely 
unchallenged by other states internationally, whose ambivalence has often served the 
interests of nations forming alliances with regional entities. As such, Öcalan has 
argued that it is state structures—with their attendant nationalism, sexism, and 
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religious morality—that have been the chief source of Kurdish suffering. He 
therefore argues there is no rationale for replicating such oppressive structures 
(Öcalan 2013b, pp15-18).  
The ideological break with these constructs in Rojava offers opportunities for new 
forms of flourishing for women, multiple ethnicities, and multiple religions, an 
ambition which has not been sought within the neighbouring Kurdistan Region in 
Iraq, whose identity is founded on nationalism.  
iii. Class 
Class has a prominent role in Kurdish identity (Yörük and Özsoy 2013). Largely as 
a result of long-term state repression and marginalisation, Kurds across the four states 
are more likely to experience deprivation, with high rates of unemployment, 
relatively low levels of education, and little social and cultural capital due to 
widespread racism and cultural genocide (Tejel 2008; Hassanpour et al. 1996). This 
is despite Kurdistan being mineral-rich, and boasting one of the largest oil reserves 
in the world.  
The Kurdistan Region in Iraq, its booming oil economy notwithstanding, has high 
levels of poverty and unemployment, with widespread corruption and wealth 
concentration (Al-Ali and Pratt 2011b; Iddon 2017)). Democratic confederalism in 
Rojava favours a more proactive approach to social equality through political 
intervention. Economic redistribution is a core value, and is typified in the 
reassignment of land to the poorest citizens, while concentration of wealth is 
circumvented by minimal markets and price caps on tradeable commodities (Yegin 
2015). Most importantly, participatory democracy ensures that marginal voices may 
be heard. As such, and particularly in combination with factors such as gender and 
ethnicity, the social contract of Rojava promises to minimise the effect of class on 
social, political, and material flourishing.  
v. Sexuality 
One axis whose absence is conspicuous in the growing literature on gender in Rojava 
is sexuality in any of its guises: in relation to the sexual lives of women, in relation 
to sex and gender fluidity, and in relation to non-normative sexualities (Gupta 
2016b). Discourses around sexual and reproductive justice are sophisticated, if still 
peripheral, across West Asia18 even in (increasingly) hostile social contexts, yet in 
Rojava, where gender equality seems to have made such tangible strides, 
considerations of sexuality are lagging. In this vein, Ghazzawi (2017) describes the 
discrimination faced by LGBTQ people in Rojava, and suggests that local struggles 
have been overshadowed by the broader political movement in Rojava, within which 
they have not been offered a place at the table. Al-Ali and Tas (2018a, 11) describe 
the enforced celibacy of men and women fighters, which reflects the moral value 
placed on resisting sexual desire. There appears to be an assumption that gender-
egalitarianism requires the rejection of the sexual in all its forms, which may be seen 
as a concession to “conservative patriarchal gender norms” (Al-Ali and Tas 2018b, 
468). On this matter, proponents of jineology appear to have a long road ahead. 
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Tackling the axes of oppression described in this section—ethnicity, gender, 
nationality, class, and sexuality—is facilitated by access to appropriate spaces for 
consciousness-raising and organizing. In the next section, I explore the importance 
of women-only spaces to feminism in Rojava. 
 
Autonomous spaces  
Autonomous spaces, also known as “safe spaces,” have been the subject of much 
controversy in Western contexts, where they are often misunderstood to be 
unjustifiably divisive, or tantamount to echo chambers within which insiders can 
avoid discomfort, shun opposition, and stymie debate (Shahvisi 2018). Of course, 
their exclusivity is precisely their point, and is easily justified. Autonomous spaces 
are intentional sites of political conversation and organisation within which 
marginalised groups who experience epistemic injustice (c.f. Fricker 2007) in the 
mainstream knowledge economy discuss their marginalisation without the 
distraction, interrogation, fear, or self-consciousness they may experience in the 
presence of those positioned outside those identities.  
Women-only spaces are now rare in Western contexts, and are generally unpopular 
where they are proposed or enacted. This is despite women-only educational and 
political spaces having been common in the 1970s and 1980s (Leathwood 2004). 
While there was never a clear consensus, separatism was at that time often seen as 
“fundamental to the survival and sanity of feminists, both as individuals and as a 
movement. We needed to create ‘safe’ spaces where we could grow and learn and 
experiment” (Hartsock 1983). There is a curious presumption that liberal societies 
have moved beyond such necessities and a widespread misunderstanding evident in 
the contention that they produce new injustices by “excluding” men. Within Rojava, 
the moral worth of autonomous spaces in the present day appears to be self-evident. 
At all levels of governance, women-only working committees operate alongside 
quota-driven co-chaired committees in order to resist the re-enactment of patriarchal 
norms (c.f. Cemgil and Hoffman 2016). This includes women-only commissions and 
women-only judicial committees. Unlike other mixed military organisations, where 
women combatants fight alongside men, in Rojava the YPJ has independent 
battalions, led by women commanders, and empowered to influence the culture and 
ethos of the protection units as a whole. It is deemed that “even the presence of men 
in the same organisation with women may hinder the uncovering of the full potential 
of women” (Cemgil and Hoffman 2016, 66).  This indicates an overt commitment to 
the merit of autonomous spaces. 
Women-only spaces may be seen as a natural extension of the decentralising of 
governance within Rojava in accordance with democratic confederalism. As well as 
decentralising geographically to constituent communes which cater to 
geographically-differential needs, the decentralisation extends also conceptually to 
accommodate socially differential needs. Thus, even though quotas for women are in 
effect at all levels of governance, women-only spaces exist as parallel institutions. 
This pays due regard to the difficulties posed by expecting a marginalised group to 
identify, articulate, and address its needs effectively in the presence of those to whom 
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it has been historically subjugated. There is a recognition that women are best placed 
to determine the solutions to problems that affect them chiefly or uniquely. In the 
theoretical literature, Frye (1993) has called for separatism as a necessary condition 
for women’s liberation, on the basis that it disrupts men’s expectation of, or 
entitlement to, access to women. Similarly, Öcalan recognises men’s dependence on 
women—echoing Frye’s description of “male parasitism”—and suggests that 
women’s liberation can only be achieved if the “enslaving emotions, needs and 
desires of husband, father, lover, brother, friend and son can all be removed” (2013a, 
52). 
It is important to note the provenance of these women-only battalions, which arose 
from women’s difficulties in being taken seriously while fighting alongside men in 
mixed units in the 1980s (Dirik and Staal 2015). In light of this, one wonders whether 
these autonomous spaces are likely to be producing or entrenching customs of gender 
segregation that will ultimately be intransigent to future revision. Gender-segregated 
spaces are not uncommon within the countries across which Kurdistan is divided, in 
accordance with cultural norms and/or religious direction or law, or women’s 
attempts to avoid sexual harassment. Accordingly, in Kurdish society, informal 
gender-segregation is not unusual. This is likely to play some role in producing the 
acceptability of autonomous spaces within Rojava.  
So whilst Western liberal arguments opposing autonomous spaces are usually 
misguided, the cultural and historical context in Rojava presents an entirely different 
challenge, which may not go so far as to diminish the undoubtedly vital role that 
autonomous spaces currently play within Rojava, but must certainly give reason for 
caution as its young institutions take root. Returning briefly to the remarks on 
sexuality at the end of the previous subsection, it is not clear to what extent the 
conservatism that demands celibacy is also responsible for the norm of autonomous 
spaces.  
Combatting masculinity 
It is hard to imagine a polemical feminist text in a Western context having any serious 
influence on policy, even less so if one of its chapter headings was “Killing the 
dominant male.” Öcalan’s pamphlet “Liberating Life: Woman’s Revolution” (Öcalan 
2013a) is dedicated to achieving gender equality through the transformation of 
masculinity and the elimination of norms of male dominance, and has strongly 
informed considerations of gender in the new political structures within Rojava.  
Feminism in Western contexts has been vilified along many dimensions, but perhaps 
none so damning as the idea that it is “anti-men” or sets out solely or chiefly to rob 
men of their masculinity. No matter how sensible some version of this objective may 
be, as a rule feminists have strategically avoided centring masculinity in their 
interactions with establishment politics, instead focussing on pursuing positive gains 
for women. 
In the aforementioned provocatively-titled chapter, Öcalan describes his views as 
follows: “it is important to place on the agenda the problem of man, which is far more 
serious than the issue of woman. It is probably more difficult to analyse the concepts 
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of domination and power, concepts related to man. It is not woman but man that is 
unwilling to transform” (2013a, 50). In Rojava, where women have so visibly begun 
to erode gender stereotypes, it would be easy to declare the bulk of the work done or 
the course set. Yet for Öcalan, and those whose praxis draws on his writing, 
masculinity is bound up with all forms of oppression and misuses of power, including 
class and state, as well as gender, so that undoing or destabilising masculinity is 
critical to undoing oppression and obtaining social justice.  
Unlike neoliberal feminism, Rojavan feminism does not see the solution to women’s 
oppression as merely the creation of opportunities or the removal of barriers. Rather, 
the reformation of masculinity is seen as critical to social change. A report of the 
confederation of women’s organizations describes the way in which men have “lost 
the freedom of emotional expression, as this is not considered masculine. They have 
not been taught how to do housework, or how to take care of themselves, of the 
children, of the elderly or the ill” (Kongreya Star 2016). Accordingly, men undertake 
training which intends to “rehabilitate” them by disabusing them of gender 
stereotypical and oppressive attitudes, generally by undertaking an education in 
history of oppression and the origins of modern inequality (Cartier 2017).  
Autonomous spaces, as discussed in the previous subsection, are critical to the task 
of combatting masculinity, and derive from the same key principle: women will not 
be free while men hold on to power; spaces will not be liberating while men dominate 
rather than share them. This principle has been key to the speed and efficacy with 
which Rojava has managed to overthrow so many deeply-ingrained gender roles. 
Media representations of women fighters miss this arguably more radical and far-
reaching side of Rojava entirely. As one YPJ combatant said:  
When you look at YPJ from the outside you assume that they are only 
warriors and that is the only change that has happened for women – that they 
are now allowed to join the military. This is not true, it has changed gender 
roles in society as a whole, changed the mind-set of women and men. The 
family structure has really changed, it is not same as before when men 
decided everything, and men cannot dominate women anymore. Men have 
changed their behaviour completely, which we are very glad about (quote 
cited in Ghotbi 2016, 33). 
Conclusion 
In Rojava, the prevailing ideology may be inferred from both the Constitution and 
from observed practices. Those structures reject nationhood, and attempt to 
undermine power dynamics in relation to ethnicity, gender, class, and the 
environment. I have discussed all but the last in this paper, which deserves separate 
attention. I will simply say here that it is important to note the commonalities between 
the environmentalism of Rojava and the features of ecofeminism, a branch of 
feminism which extends the critique of patriarchy to the natural world (see e.g. Gaard 
2011; Biehl 1998).   
The ideology that is enacted in Rojava derives from a steadfast commitment to 
democratic confederalism and jineology. Its features have been glossed in popular 
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Western representations of Rojava, which is a considerable loss, since they form an 
important and instructive model of feminism operating in stark contrast to the 
neoliberal variants common in Western contexts. 
Theory has played a key role in Rojava, and will surely demarcate its future if its 
current moral and political credentials are to be maintained. Without theory, practice 
can easily become myopic; without practice, theory cannot be tested or refined. While 
theory provides heuristics and ambitions which direct the process of political 
transition and keep it to course, as Cemgil and Hoffman (2016) note, “much is 
determined by the reality on the ground.” Those at the forefront of movements must 
constantly reflect on the gap between the two.  
One example of a clear role for theory in Rojava is the aforementioned lacuna with 
respect to considerations of sexuality. Without incorporating sexual and reproductive 
justice into the agenda, women and people of non-normative sexualities will not be 
adequately served or protected by Rojavan ideology or legislation. Activists in 
Rojava might reasonably find themselves turning to networks elsewhere in the 
region, as well as reflecting on the way in which the theoretical foundations of 
Rojava—specifically, the undermining of patriarchy—seem to commit social justice 
advocates to ensuring that sexual and reproductive justice sit high on the agenda.   
I have not addressed the question of the sustainability of the political structures in 
Rojava, which have has arisen in the vacuum created by the suspension of routine 
state structures during the Syrian revolution. This naturally leads to the question as 
to the generalisability of the feminist politics seen in Rojava. If the weakening of the 
state is a prerequisite in the overhauling of social institutions, it seems that Rojava 
may for the foreseeable future remain a political novelty, rather than a model or even 
an ideal.19  
There is need for caution if the gains made in Rojava are to outlast whatever post-
conflict settlements are made in Syria. The early signs look promising; as Bengio 
(2016) notes, unlike in Egypt and Yemen, where leading women revolutionaries were 
quickly side-lined by new regimes, in Rojava women endure and thrive at the core of 
the movement, even six years into the revolution. Even so, while the nascent political 
institutions within Rojava appear to be robust, and enjoy association with Öcalan’s 
widely-favoured philosophy, it seems unlikely that the time-honoured patriarchal 
culture described in the previous section has been substantively reformed over such 
a short timescale, and much more likely that enthusiasm for a functioning 
autonomous West Kurdistan at an inimitable moment in history has encouraged 
people to set aside any collective concept of normalcy or convention in the face of 
tremendous hope. As Dirik (2014b) notes: 
Wartime, uprisings, social unrest often provide women with space to assert 
themselves and to demand representation in ways that normal, civilian life 
would not permit. […] However, once the crisis situation is over, […] a 
return to previous antebellum normalcy and conservatism is often deemed 
necessary to reestablish civil life. This often constitutes the rearticulation of 
traditional gender roles, which are in turn detrimental to the newly gained 
status of women. 
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Perhaps the future of Rojava will therefore hinge on its ability to deliver on the hope 
it has garnered, but if so, that will depend critically on the extent to which regional 
and international actors tolerate its existence as a peace-time contemporary.     
Finally, when reflecting on the paradigm shift required for the present political 
situation in Rojava to be possible, it is hard not to be reminded of Judith Butler’s 
reflections on the future of the Palestinian struggle, and the role of theory in 
determining the outcomes of complex political situations.  
[W]hat would it mean if we lived in a world in which no one held out for the 
possibility of substantial political equality, or for a full cessation of colonial 
practices - if no one held out for those things because they were impossible? 
[…] [M]aybe one of the jobs of theory or philosophy is to elevate principles 
that seem impossible, or that have the status of the impossible, to stand by 
them and will them, even when it looks highly unlikely that they'll ever be 
realised. […] What would happen if we lived in a world where there were no 
people who did that? It would be an impoverished world (2014). 
 
In Rojava, something close to impossible is being realized, as feminists work to 
generate a liberatory politics tailored to their local context, while applying pressure 
within a highly patriarchal society to seize and retain the share of power that buys 
them the space to learn and enact change. In the midst of this century’s longest and 
bloodiest conflict, a stateless people who have long set their sights on a unique set of 
political ideals have won the opportunity to put them into practice. Remarkably, 
given its low priority and tokenism in political systems elsewhere in the world, 
gender equality is a core value of this movement. Whatever the future of Rojava, we 
can all learn from its people’s dogged commitment to combatting a range of injustices 
with unflagging optimism in the most unlikely of contexts.  
 
Notes
1 Çaha (2011, pp 436-7) describes the way in which calls for attention to women’s rights were spurned 
within the PKK in the 1990s, where they were described as a “luxury,” stemming from women 
“exaggerating” about their situations.  
3 Not to mention a porous, arbitrary border, across which there is the regular flow of “bodies, goods, and 
commodities but also ideological commitments, memories, moral principles, and political strategies” 
(Küçük and Özselçuk 2016, p.189). 
4 This article only considers mass media in the English language, and does not consider coverage in 
other European languages. This reflects the author’s language limitations, but ought not to significantly 
limit the generalisability of claims about Western representations, due to the dominance of English-
language media.  
5 As described by Said (1978) and addressed from the perspective of women by e.g. Lewis (1996). 
6 I favour this term over the more common Eurocentric colonial descriptor “Middle East,” but the 
referent is the same.  
7 Consider how little has changed since Samuel Johnson’s 1763 sexist quip about women preachers “Sir, 
a woman’s preaching is like a dog’s walking on his hind legs.  It is not done well; but you are surprised 
to find it done at all” (Boswell 1873). 
8 Another adverse effect of coverage of YPJ women in Western media is its co-optation into right-wing 
racist discourses of West Asian women fighting just wars while men constitute the majority of those 
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arriving in Europe as refugees. One needs only to glance at the comments section underneath 
mainstream coverage of Kurdish women militants in the British press to see remarks which imply that 
these women are burdened with combat while their men (ostensibly through cowardice or avarice) seek 
asylum in Europe. 
9 In fact, a scarf tied around the waist is not considered to be a sign of femininity in Kurdistan—it is part 
of the traditional dress for men and women.  
10 Though suicide attacks are repudiated within the Kurdish struggle, they are not unknown. In the 
battle for Kobane, twenty-year old soldier Arin Mirkan strapped grenades to her chest and detonated 
them while lying under a Daesh tank (Mogelson 2017). 
11 Soldiers under the age of 18 are in violation of international law, and the YPJ and YPG have 
committed to demobilising these fighters (Human Rights Watch 2014).  
12 Though consider that in Turkey, where the ostensibly secular state is becoming increasingly Islamised, 
the Kurdish struggle is portrayed as the archetypal terrorist struggle. 
13 Psychologists (Forgiarini et al. 2011) have shown that similarities in skin colour correlate with felt 
empathy, and the disposition to be compassionate and cooperative. 
14 Trivialising representations of Kurdish women’s activism in this way is exacerbated by a broader failure 
within the media to acknowledge the role of Western states in oppressing Kurds and assisting regional 
state powers in repression. The UK and the US have lately been keen to be viewed as allies to the People’s 
Protection Units in Rojava, and have provided weapons and funds to the units, yet both states continue 
to list the PKK—the closest ally of the YPG/J—as a terrorist organisation.  Continuing to classify the PKK 
as a terrorist organisation licenses state violence in Turkey (c.f. Sirinathsingh 2014). The vilification of the 
PKK in the international imagination is arguably the greatest barrier to justice for Kurdish people. 
15 Bengio (2016) offers an instructive history of Kurdish women leaders.  
16 One of its earliest articulations dating back to Black women’s rights activist and abolitionist Sojourner 
Truth’s speech in 1851, in which she famously demanded of those pursuing rights for white women 
according to a model of womanhood centred on white women’s experiences: “ain’t I a woman?” 
17 Perceived as a threat to conservative ideals of femininity, the media in Iran and Turkey target the 
women of Rojava with abusive and trivialising coverage, focussed largely on portraying them as sexually-
deviant (Dirik 2014a). 
18 See e.g. Kohl: a Journal for Body and Gender Research, a recently-founded Beirut-based journal 
committed to publishing gender and sexuality research from across the Middle East, South West Asia, 
and North Africa regions.   
19 Leezenberg (2016) describes the way in which the success of Rojava, particularly in the battle for 
Kobane, emboldened urban guerrilla PKK-sympathisers in South-Eastern Turkey to mount an armed 
insurgency, which was mercilessly quashed. He interprets this an example of the difficulty of exporting 
democratic confederalism outside of the “power vacuum in the Rojava laboratory” (p. 685).  
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